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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In all cases where malice or want of probable cause is absent, no
liability exists apart from the injunction bond and recovery is limited
to the penal sum thereof. 14 In North Carolina, the judgment dissolving the injunction carries with it a judgment for damages against
the parties procuring it and the sureties on the undertaking, to be
ascertained by reference or otherwise as the judge directs. 15 But
there can be no assessment of damages until the final determination
of the cause in which the injunction is obtained. 16 A motion for
damages must be made at or before the time the final judgment is
17
entered and no separate action can be maintained upon the bond.
This procedure raises difficult problems where a foreclosure sale is
restrained and the injunction continues until the final adjudication.
In such cases it will be necessary to assess damages before there can
be a sale. It must be shown that the debt, interest, and costs will not
-be realized on a sale and that the value of the security has been impaired. An actual sale is the easiest and most reliable way to establish this. The difficulty is obviated by permitting a separate action
on the bond after the sale has taken place.' 8
T. C. SMITH, JR.
Equity-Injunction to Prevent Garnishment of WagesEffect of Usury
In a recent Georgia case,' a wage earner sought an injunction
against the enforcement of a "sale of wages" given as a security for
a loan alleged to have been usurious, on the ground that the plaintiff
would lose his job if garnishment proceedings were brought. The
" 10th Ward Rd. District v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 12 F. (2d) 245; 45
A. L. R. 1513 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Mark v. Hyatt, 135 N. Y. 306, 31 N. E.
1099; 18 L. R. A. 275 (1892); McAden v. Williams, 191 N. C. 105, 131 S. E.
375 (1926); Nausemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N. C. 51, 29 S. E. 61
(1898).
" N. C. AN1. CODE (Michie, 1927) §855.
"'Raleigh and Western Ry. Co. v. Glendon and Gulf Mining and Manufacturing Co., 117 N. C. 191, 23 S. E. 181 (1895); Thompson v. McNair, 64
N. C. 448 (1870) (an injunction is an ancillary remedy and until the final
determination of the cause, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the order
was not rightfully obtained).
Crawford v. Pearson, 116 N. C. 718, 21 S. E. 561 (1895) ; Shute v. Shute,
180 N. C. 386, 104 S. E. 764 (1920). See McCall v. Webb, 135 N. C. 356, 365,
42 S. E. 802, 805 (1904).
"'Okla. Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Hooven, supra note 13; Belmont Mining
Co. v. Costigan, supra note 4; Gibson v. Reed, supra note 4. In the absence of
a statute permitting damages to be recovered in the same action, they cannot
be allowed. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 76 Iowa 278, 41 N. W. 17
(1888) ; American Bonding Co. v. State, 120 Md. 305, 87 Ati. 922 (1913).

'Lawrence v. Patterson, 153 S. E. 29 (Ga. 1930).
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defendants filed demurrers, pleas and counter-claims for the full
amount of the wages assigned. Upon an auditor's finding in favor of
defendants, held, injunction denied unless plaintiff first pay principal
and lawful interest, as "he who comes into equity must do equity";
and lenders' counter-claim allowed. The Chief Justice dissented.
Nearly all of the decisions agree with the principal case that when
a debtor seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a usurious loan, he "must
do equity" by paying into court the amount lawfully due, including
principal and the legal rate of interest. 2 And the same view is taken
whether the security given is an assignment of wages3 or a mortgage.
On its face, this might seem fair enough. There were in the principal
case, however, a number of factors which cast doubt on the fairness
of this requirement in wage assignment cases generally.
It should first be noted, however, that the announced condition to
an injunction that the plaintiff pay the legal rate of interest as well as
the principal, when the Georgia statutes 4 provide for the forfeiture
of all interest on usurious loans, is misleading. This was uttered in
connection with a finding that the loan was not usurious. And the
judgment on the counter-claim, actually affirmed, did not speak in
terms of principal and interest but was for the total wages for a given
period on the theory that the title thereto had passed to the defendants
and that the plaintiff by taking the wages had converted them. This
assumes, as does the defendants' own description of themselves as
"buyers of salaries" that the loans were never expected to be paid.
The statute permitted but 33 % per annum on loans of less than
$300.00. It was alleged that the usury came into the case by the
method of charging for renewals of loans in short periods of less
than thirty days, and that "petitioner signed papers for the defendants
without reading the same, knowing that they were made out as only
a part of a scheme and a device to defeat the usury laws, by signing
2
Mortgage Securities Corp. v. Levy, 11 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ;
Polite v. Williams, 149 Ga. 726, 10 S. E. 791 (1920); Poulk v. Cario Banking
Co., 158 Ga. 338, 12 S.E. 292 (1924) ; Carver v. Brady, 104 N. C. 220, 10 S.E.
565 (1889); Owens v. Wright, 161 N. C. 127, 76 S.E. 735, ANN. CAs. 1914D,
1021 (1912) ; LAWRaNcE, EQ. Jus. (1929) §1089; PommoY, EQ. Jus. (4th ed.)
§§391, 937.
There is some authority for the proposition that a penalty for usury provided by statute may be deducted from the principal and legal rate of interest.
Lewis v. Hickman, 200 Ala. 672, 77 So. 46 (1917); Union Bank v. Bell, 14
Ohio St. 200 (1862) ; Yonack v. Emery, 13 S.W. (2d) 677 (Tex. 1929).
'Patterson v. Moore, 146 Ga. 364, 91 S.E. 116 (1917); Roberts v. Penn.
Loan and Trust Co., 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 358 (1909) ; cf. Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal.
App. 553, 102 Pac. 956 (1909).

"GA. ANN. CoDa (Michie, 1926) §§3438, 3439.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
the same because he needed the money." There were eight of these
"buyers of salaries" from whom the plaintiff had borrowed a number
of sums ranging from $5.00 to $15.00 each over a year's time.
Although the defendants in their counter-claim had raised a legal
issue on which plaintiff was by the Constitution entitled to a jury,5
the case was referred to an auditor. The plaintiff excepted on the
ground, among others, that the auditor was prejudiced against enforcement of the small loans of the state, and was disqualified because
other loan companies were clients of his law office. Finally, it was
alleged that the service of the wage assignment on the employer
would cause plaintiff to lose his position. The court objected that the
allegation was too general, in that it did not set out facts to show
petitioner would lose his position or be irreparably injured. But in
an earlier Georgia case, 6 plaintiff had failed although he set out a
contract of employment in which the plaintiff was to be discharged,
if garnishment or wage assignment papers were ever served.
This characteristic failure7 to investigate the actualities of economic duress and of the effects of garnishment proceedings in connection with the small loan business is, doubtless, the reason for
remedial legislation in Massachusetts 8 and Minnesota9 and for the
drastic action of the California' 0 and Kansas" 1 courts, which last
year, upon injunction proceedings brought by the Attorney General,
stopped the operation of a "loan-shark" business as a public nuisance.
H. B. PARKER.

Equity-Injunction to Restrain Enforcement of
Municipal Ordinance
An ordinance imposed an occupation tax upon persons engaged in
the business of delivering gasoline and oils from wagons or trucks.
Plaintiff failed to pay this tax and defendant caused a levy to be made
'GA. CONSr., §18, par. 1; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 64.

' Patterson v. Moore, supra note 3.
"Lisle, A Widespread Form of Usury: The "Loan-Shark" (1912) 3 J.
CRIm. L. 167; Hodson, Ideal Anti-Loan Shark Statute (1919) 10 J. CRIm. L.
129.
'Acrs MAss. (1911) c. 727, §13; Thomas v. Bunce, 223 Mass. 311, 111
N. E. 871 (1916).
'MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §7040; Trauernicht v. Kingston, 136 Minn.
445, 195 N. W. 278 (1923).
" People ex rel Stephens v. Seccombe, 284 Pac. 725 (Cal. App. 1930);
(1930)

18 CALIF. L. REv. 328.

State v. McMahon, 280 Pac. 906 (Kan. 1929); (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q.
472; (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 499; (1929) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 939.
'

